Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, announced that the country will continue to adhere to the numerical limits established by the expired New START nuclear weapons treaty, contingent upon similar compliance from the United States. Speaking before the State Duma on February 11, 2023, Lavrov stated, “Our stance is that the moratorium declared by the president is still active, but only if the United States does not surpass the established limits.” This declaration follows the treaty’s expiration on February 5, 2023, marking the first time in over fifty years that the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals operate without binding restrictions.
The New START treaty, signed in 2010, originally capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 for each country and was extended for five additional years by Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in 2021. The treaty aimed to promote strategic stability between the United States and Russia. In contrast, former President Donald Trump rejected a proposal from Putin for a voluntary one-year extension, criticizing the agreement as “a poorly negotiated agreement” and advocating for a modernized replacement that would include China.
China’s government has consistently declined to participate in trilateral arms control discussions, asserting that its nuclear arsenal is significantly smaller than those of the U.S. and Russia. Within Russia, some officials have suggested that the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and France should also be considered in any future arms control negotiations. Historically, all major strategic arms reduction treaties have been bilateral, but addressing concerns from both Moscow and Washington would necessitate a multilateral framework, a process experts warn could be particularly complex.
In February 2023, Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty, citing an “unsatisfactory state of affairs” regarding its implementation. Nevertheless, Moscow has continued to observe the treaty’s numerical limits. This suspension terminated the inspections and data exchanges that had provided transparency and oversight of both nations’ arsenals.
Lavrov’s recent commitment to uphold these limits offers only limited reassurance in a landscape devoid of verification mechanisms. Without regular inspections or legally binding obligations, both countries now rely on intelligence assessments to ascertain compliance. This reliance creates a precarious foundation for nuclear stability, especially in light of heightened geopolitical tensions surrounding the conflict in Ukraine and broader strategic competition on the global stage.
The absence of a formal agreement and the suspension of verification processes contribute to an atmosphere of uncertainty. As both nations navigate this fragile situation, the implications for international security remain significant. The future of nuclear arms control will depend on diplomatic efforts to reinstate trust and establish effective verification mechanisms, a challenging endeavor given the current geopolitical climate.
